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ABSTRACT 
 
Terror management scholars proposed people’s attitudes, actions, and behaviors are driven by 
the anxiety associated with the awareness of death. Much evidence currently supports the notion 
that people act defensively and are less tolerant of others when they are reminded of death. But 
this might have been due to the narrow way that terror management researchers have typically 
primed people to think about death in their studies. The present study compared two different 
death reminder procedures on people’s willingness to forgive and to accept an apology. This 
study found that people who were reminded of death by a typical death reminder priming were 
more unwilling to forgive and more unwilling to accept an apology than people reminded of 
death by a death reminder priming that also involved thinking of others. Results of this study 
provided evidence that some reminders of death can prompt people to act less defensively and 
that the way thoughts of death are evoked matters. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Death is the inevitable conclusion to life. When thinking about death, people may 
sometimes reflect on their actions, relationships, physical possessions, and achievements. 
Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (1986) argued in terror management theory that, when 
people think about death, these thoughts cause an overwhelming amount of anxiety and that this 
anxiety motivates human behavior. Solomon et al. put forth that people manage this fear through 
structures that buffer the anxiety. Researchers in their studies have used a variety of methods to 
make people think about death to examine how the fear of death is managed by these structures. 
Burke, Martens, and Faucher’s (2010) meta-analysis examined 20 years of research on 
one of the central predictions of terror management theory, called the mortality salience 
hypothesis. Burke et al. found much support for this hypothesis in that when people thought of 
death, as compared to a nonthreatening or threatening control topic, they had more negative 
attitudes toward a person or entity that went against their beliefs. Moreover, Burke et al. reported 
that the research evidence consistently showed that when people thought of death, they were 
more likely to engage in actions that served to validate their views or serve themselves, than 
when they did not think about death. 
 Burke et al. (2010) noted, however, that the procedures used to make people think about 
death were relatively similar across studies and tended to make people focus on the act of dying 
itself, which is only one way to think about death. Burke et al. called on scholars to examine 
other conceptualizations, and hence operationalizations of a reminder of death, that include 
people reflecting on their lives when thinking about death. Indeed, operationalizing reminders of 
death in a more expansive manner may be associated with other evaluations and behaviors. A 
behavior that might be influenced differently by a more expansive operationalization of death is 
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forgiveness because forgiving can be a powerful method of healing relationships after 
transgressions (Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008; Waldron & Kelley, 2008; 
Worthington, Brown, & Mcconnell, 2018). To investigate this possibility, I will discuss terror 
management theory, the way death has been operationalized, and how operationalizing death 
differently might be related to forgiveness. 
Terror Management Theory 
 
Becker’s (1971; 1973; 1975) works introduced the interdisciplinary idea that death drives 
the behaviors that people engage in. According to Becker, humans possess highly sophisticated 
intellectual abilities that allow them to be aware of their own mortality. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
and Solomon (1997) believed that this awareness may cause a sense of terror that can prevent a 
person from feeling purposeful. Solomon et al. (1986; 2015) and Pyszczynski et al.’s (2015) 
terror management theory suggests that people manage this terror. To examine how this terror is 
managed and how it affects people’s behaviors, scholars (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 
2010; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Solomon et al., 1986) 
articulated three propositions of the terror management framework: the anxiety-buffering 
hypothesis, the death thought accessibility hypothesis, and the mortality salience hypothesis. 
The Anxiety-Buffering Hypothesis 
Solomon et al. (1986) explained that the anxiety buffering hypothesis is the prediction 
that people’s anxiety associated with the awareness of mortality can be reduced if they maintain 
the strength of their anxiety-buffering structures. Pyszczynski et al. (1999) argued that people 
maintain the anxiety-buffering structures through a system, called the dual process model of 
defense. 
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Anxiety-buffering structures. Several scholars (Mikulincer, Florian, and Hirschberger, 
2003; Pyszczynski et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 1986; 2015) have explained different anxiety-
buffering structures. Some structures researchers have identified are: people’s cultural 
worldviews, people’s sense of self-worth or self-esteem, and people’s close relationships. 
Cultural worldviews. According to Solomon et al. (1986), humans live within a shared 
symbolic perception of the universe that is determined by what culture they are born in to. 
Researchers (Becker, 1973; 1975, Greenberg and Arndt, 2011; Kashima, 2010) posited that 
culture was constructed as a system of shared meanings among people that acts as a mechanism 
to protect against the awareness of mortality and minimize the terror caused by this awareness. 
Greenberg and Arndt (2011) and Solomon et al. (1986) argued that culture ingrains people’s 
reality with “order, stability, meaning, and purpose” (p. 402; p. 196). Additionally, Greenberg et 
al. (2008) suggested that culture provides humans with the capacity to believe they are 
contributing to the world rather than just being animals trying to survive.  
Pyszczynski et al. (2015) expressed that religion was created out of a need for more 
death-denial beliefs. Pyszczynski et al. explained that religion is a central aspect of culture and 
helps people to understand the concept of death and to help facilitate social interaction. Further, 
religion was thought to provide a support base for people’s cultural worldviews (Jonas & 
Fischer, 2006). This is because a religion might have a shared meaning structure (Becker, 1971), 
have a way to explain life after death (Goodenough, 1986), be a distraction from death-related 
concerns (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcynski, 1991a), and be a source of support and mental 
health enhancement (Bergin, 1991). In other words, religion has many different properties that 
can help people understand death, and as such, religion supports people’s cultural worldviews. 
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To date, researchers have yet to examine the anxiety-buffering properties of the cultural 
worldviews. Despite this, Pyszczynski et al. (2015) argued that culture buffers the terror caused 
by the awareness of mortality because people might feel minimal terror if they know that they 
live by the values of their culture. Some values might be observed through adhering to the 
principles in a chosen religion or a culture’s customs and traditions. Becker (1973; 1975) noted 
that culture provides a recipe as to how people can live a good and meaningful life.  
Additionally, scholars (Plusnin et al., 2018; Solomon et al., 2015; Vail III et al., 2010) 
described the effect of culture as minimizing people’s terror because culture can reinforce or 
support the belief that people can be immortal. Literal immortality is defined as a belief in an 
afterlife or reincarnation (Solomon et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2010; Schoenrade, 1998). Symbolic 
immortality is defined as a belief that people can be remembered by others in the world long 
after they die (Florian and Mikulincer, 1998). Solomon et al. and Pyzczynski et al. (2015) 
suggested that people may feel a sense of immortality by having kids or by living by their 
culture’s values and teachings.  
Self-esteem. Greenberg et al. (1997) contended that self-esteem is an anxiety-buffer for 
mortality awareness because it enables people to maintain their composure in the face of 
thoughts about death. Self-esteem in the terror management framework is defined as people’s 
feeling of self-worth based on how well they live up to their cultural worldview (Arndt & Vess, 
2008; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Pyzczynski et al., 1990; Solomon et al., 1991a, 1986).  
Researchers (Greenberg & Arndt, 2011; Solomon et al. 1986; 1991a; 1991b; 2015) have 
argued that humans have a basic psychological need for security and people’s initial sense of 
self-esteem is based on receiving security from caregivers (Schimel, Hayes, & Scharp, 2018). 
Pyszczynski et al. (2015) added that caregivers teach their children to act in accordance with 
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their cultural worldviews. If children do not act in line with their caregivers’ worldviews, they 
are punished in the form of unmet security needs, or possibly even death (Greenberg and Arndt, 
2011; Pyszczynski et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 1986, 2015).  
One series of studies examined how influencing people’s self-esteem buffers against 
anxiety. Greenberg, Solomon et al. (1992) enhanced people’s self-esteem by providing them 
positive personality feedback. They found that the people who were reminded of death and 
received a self-esteem boost reported lower levels of anxiety than people who were reminded of 
death and did not receive a self-esteem boost. In a different set of studies, they found that 
participants had lower levels of anxiety in response to the threat of shock when they received a 
self-esteem enhancement compared to those who did not.  
Some scholars have examined how people’s trait self-esteem or enhancing people’s self-
esteem curtails people’s reactions to reminders of death. For example, Harmon-Jones et al. 
(1997) found that if people have high trait self-esteem or received a self-esteem enhancement, 
their defensiveness towards a hypothetical person with a dissimilar cultural worldview was 
reduced. Hohman and Hogg (2015) reported that people whose self-esteem was enhanced and 
who were reminded of death evaluated a culturally dissimilar other less negatively than people 
whose self-esteem was not enhanced. 
Other researchers (Baldwin & Wesley, 1996; Hirschberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2002) 
reported the opposite effect for self-esteem, in that people with high trait self-esteem had a 
negative reaction to a reminder of death. For example, Baldwin and Wesley found that people 
who had high trait self-esteem and were reminded of death had a more negative evaluation of a 
person from a cultural outgroup than those who had moderate trait self-esteem. Hirschberger et 
al. found that people who had high trait self-esteem and were reminded of death had more 
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stringent requirements when selecting a mate, such as better interpersonal skills, greater physical 
attractiveness, higher social status, and more intellect, compared to those who had low trait self-
esteem. 
Burke et al. (2010) explained that the inconsistent findings for self-esteem was related to 
situations in which self-esteem was measured as a trait. What can be concluded then, if measured 
trait self-esteem is excluded, is that increasing self-esteem, such as by receiving a self-esteem 
enhancement compared to not receiving a self-esteem enhancement, is associated with people 
having reduced negative reactions when reminded of death.  
Close relationships. Scholars have recently proposed that people are driven by the 
anxiety caused by the awareness of death to form and maintain close relationships with others 
(Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005; Mikulincer et al., 2003). These relationships include 
people’s relationships with their parents, their children, their romantic partners, or their friends 
(Mikulincer et al.). According to Hart et al. and Mikulincer et al., a close relationship can help to 
manage the anxiety associated with the awareness of death if people are unable to receive 
adequate worldview validation or self-esteem enhancements.  
Plusnin, Pepping, and Kashima (2018) conducted a systematic review that examined the 
terror management function of close relationships. Plusnin et al. found that reminders of death 
influenced both relationship initiation and relational maintenance processes. Plusnin et al. also 
reported that people’s resultant attitudes and behaviors can be curtailed if people are able to turn 
toward a person who they have a close relationship with. However, people’s resultant attitudes 
and behaviors are moderated by gender, perception of people’s worth to the person they have a 
close bond with, and how people respond to the relief that the relationship provides.  
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Thus far, research examining the terror management functions of a close relationship has 
yet to provide an association between death-related anxiety and people’s close relationships. 
Despite this, invoking Buss and Schmitt’s (1993) evolutionary perspective, Mikulincer et al. 
(2003) argued that humans might have been driven to develop and maintain relationships 
because those who had close personal bonds had a greater likelihood of survival due to an 
increase in met security needs, resource acquisition, and reproduction chances. However, as they 
noted, some evolutionary processes are not exclusive to the anxiety buffering properties of a 
close relationship (e.g., increase in resource acquisition does not necessarily serve a death related 
anxiety-buffering function).  Mikulincer et al. also invoked Bowlby’s (1969, 1982) attachment 
theory, such that, if people are able to turn toward people who they have a close relationship 
with, they might receive emotional relief. Mikulincer et al. proposed this emotional relief 
mechanism as what could be the anxiety-buffering mechanism of a close relationship. 
The dual process model of defense. Pyszczynski et al. (1999) proposed that people 
maintain the strength of the anxiety-buffering structures (e.g., cultural worldviews, self-esteem, 
and close relationships) through a proximal and distal terror management defense. Pyszczynski 
et al. described the proximal terror management defense as an active defense that occurs when 
people are made aware of their mortality. In response to overt reminders of mortality, people 
make attempts to suppress death related thoughts (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Psyzcynski, and 
Solomon 2000; Pyszczynski et al. 1999; Pyszczynski et al.; 2015). These attempts at suppression 
typically involve people looking for tasks to distract themselves or denying their vulnerability to 
a premature death (e.g., Arndt, Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2006; Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, 
Psyzcynski, and Solomon 2000; Greenberg et al. 1994; Taubman-Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005).  
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The distal terror management defense is described as a passive defense against the 
awareness of mortality (Greenberg et al., 2000; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Wegner (1994) argued 
that active suppression of a thought may ironically increase the chance of that specific thought 
returning once active suppression ceases. In line with Wegner’s thinking, Greenberg et al. (1994) 
believed that the suppression of death related thoughts put those thoughts in a state where they 
could be easily retrieved. Pyszczynski et al. (2015) argued that the distal defense functions to 
keep the death related thoughts suppressed. They also described that when people engage in the 
distal terror management defense, they are no longer aware that the behavior they are engaged in 
is related to defending against the thoughts about death.  
Pyszczynski et al. (1999) argued that people engage in the proximal terror management 
defense first, which involves rationalizing the thoughts about death and looking for ways to 
distract themselves from those thoughts. To investigate how people proximally defend against 
the awareness of death, researchers remind people of death, then ask them a variety of questions 
related to concerns about mortality (e.g., Jessop, Albery, Rutter, & Garrod, 2008; Arndt, 
Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2006). People endorse life-span enhancing behaviors to proximally 
defend against the awareness of death. Some life-span enhancing behaviors that people endorse 
are a higher willingness to promote healthy behaviors (Taubman-Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005), an 
increased intent to maintain fitness (Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003), and a higher 
inclination to drive responsibly (Jessop et al., 2008).  
Burke et al. (2010) pointed out in their meta-analysis that the distal defense appears and 
is stronger if people are distracted from thinking about death. For instance, Arndt et al. (2003) 
found in one experiment that people’s intent to maintain their fitness became much stronger after 
a delay between making people think about death and measuring their attitudes on fitness. 
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Moreover, people’s negative attitude toward people with dissimilar beliefs were much stronger 
when distracted versus not being distracted from thinking about death (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Greenberg et al., 2000). In support of these findings, Abeyta, Juhl, and Routledge (2014) found 
that people’s self-reported death-related anxiety only increased after people are distracted from 
reminders of mortality.  
The Death Thought Accessibility Hypothesis 
Another proposition discussed in terror management theory is the death thought 
accessibility hypothesis. The death thought accessibility hypothesis is the prediction in which 
death related thoughts are more easily accessible when the anxiety-buffering structures (e.g., 
cultural worldviews, self-esteem, and close relationships) are weakened or threatened (Hayes et 
al., 2010; Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008; Pyszczynski et al., 2015; Schimel et al., 
2018).  
Terror management researchers have provided evidence for the death thought 
accessibility hypothesis, such that weakening the anxiety-buffering structures in some way will 
increase the accessibility of death related thoughts. For instance, death thought accessibility 
increases when people’s cultural worldview is criticized (Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel, Hayes, 
Williams, & Jahrig, 2007) and when people are ostracized (Steele, Kidd, & Castano, 2014). The 
accessibility of death related thoughts can also increase when people are primed to think about 
problems in their relationship (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2002) or primed to think 
about separation from or the death of their romantic partner (Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & 
Malishkevich, 2002). Taubman-Ben-Ari and Katz-Ben-Ami (2008) reported an association 
between death thought accessibility and separation anxiety, in that, mothers who thought of 
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separation from their child compared to those that did not, had stronger death related thoughts 
and stronger separation anxiety when reminded of death. 
Scholars have also provided evidence that the accessibility of death related thoughts can 
be reduced if people are given the opportunity to maintain the strength of their anxiety-buffering 
structures, or if their anxiety-buffering structures are strengthened. For example, Cox and Arndt 
(2012) found that death related thoughts can be less accessible if people thought that their 
romantic partner viewed them positively rather than negatively. Death thought accessibility will 
also be reduced when people are given the opportunity to defend their cultural worldview 
(Schimel et al., 2007) or when people receive a self-esteem enhancement (Hayes et al., 2008). 
The Mortality Salience Hypothesis 
In addition to the anxiety-buffering hypothesis and death thought accessibility 
hypothesis, the mortality salience hypothesis is another proposition of terror management theory.  
The mortality salience hypothesis is the proposition of terror management theory that has 
received the most attention from researchers (Burke et al., 2010; Plusnin et al., 2018; Steinman 
& Updegraff, 2015). Rosenblatt et al. (1989) explained that the mortality salience hypothesis 
predicts that reminding people of their mortality will increase the need to maintain the strength 
of their anxiety buffering structures. A meta-analysis, based on 277 experiments between 1989 to 
2010, yielded much support for the mortality salience hypothesis (Burke et al., 2010). 
Burke et al. (2010) found that reminding people of their mortality generated a moderate 
effect on people’s resultant attitudes, behaviors, and emotional state. They also reported that 
several between-study moderators such as the use of American college or non-college students, 
the outcome being measured, and the length of time between a reminder of death and the 
outcome being measured influenced mortality awareness effects. Burke et al. also described that 
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several within-study moderators, such as, participants’ gender and trait self-esteem can influence 
mortality awareness effects.  Burke et al. further reported that the strongest effects of the 
mortality salience induction have to do with the association between reminders of death and 
people’s attitudes toward other people. 
Subsequent to Burke et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, research still supports the mortality 
salience hypothesis. Weise, Arciszewski, Verlhiac, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2012), for 
example, found that people who were highly right-wing authoritarian evaluated immigrants more 
negatively when reminded of death compared to those who were not. Leippe, Bergold, and 
Donna (2016) described that African American and Hispanic participants who acted as mock-
jurors in a court case judged an outgroup defendant as guilty more when they were reminded of 
death compared to those not reminded of death.  
How Death Has Been Operationalized 
Researchers have operationalized death in different ways when testing terror management 
theory’s central predictions (i.e., the anxiety-buffering, death thought accessibility, mortality 
salience hypotheses). The methods that researchers have used to remind people of death appear 
to be conceptualizing and operationalizing death in a specific way and that manner is associated 
with people having negative attitudes toward dissimilar others or with people acting defensively. 
But it is possible that operationalizing death by a different conceptualization might be associated 
with people having more positive attitudes or non-defensive attitudes and behaviors. 
Death Reminder Procedures 
Procedures that were used to remind people of death can be classified under three 
different categories: explicit, implicit, and naturally occurring reminders of death (Cox, Darrell, 
& Arrowood, 2018). Using an explicit reminder of death involves asking participants directly 
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about their thoughts, feelings, and emotions associated with death. Some examples of these 
explicit methods are the fear of death scale (Boyar, 1964), the death anxiety scale (Conte, Weiner 
& Plutchik, 1982) and the mortality attitudes personality survey (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Other 
explicit reminders that Cox et al. described involve having people view death related media (e.g., 
Baka, Debris, Maxfield, 2012; Baldwin & Wesley, 1996; Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1992).  
Cox et al. (2018) characterized implicit and naturally occurring reminders of death as 
subtle reminders of death. When researchers remind people of death by an implicit reminder, 
they typically display death related stimuli outside of people’s conscious awareness or under a 
certain threshold that would make people explicitly aware of death. For example, researchers 
might present words related to “death”, along with words that are not related to death, without 
participants realizing it (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997), have participants 
complete a word search puzzle with words associated with death (Maxfield et al., 2007), or show 
participants a flyer for an institute that studies death (Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, & Almakias, 2008). 
When researchers use a naturally occurring reminder of death, they rely on stimuli within the 
physical environment (e.g., a cemetery) to remind people of death. Researchers have used 
naturally occurring reminders by interviewing people by a funeral home (Pyszczynski et al., 
1996), or in a cemetery (Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008).  
Recategorizing the death reminder procedure  
Besides categorizing death reminders as explicit, implicit, and naturally occurring ways, I 
offer a different way to categorize death, in that one way of categorizing is as “facing-death”, 
whereas another way that death can be categorized as is as “life-in-the-face-of-death”. A 
majority of death reminder procedures seem to reflect the “facing-death” conceptualization, but 
this way of conceptualizing death might be associated with perceiving death as finite, as 
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exclusively thinking about death, or thinking about death as the end.  But death can be 
conceptualized and operationalized in other ways. Another way that death can be conceived is as 
“life-in-the-face-of-death”, which might involve perceiving death more broadly, thinking about 
life while thinking about death, or thinking about death as more than just an end. 
Facing-death. One death reminder procedure that can be conceptualized as facing-death 
is Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) mortality attitudes personality survey. Burke et al. (2010) reported 
that 80% of researchers across 277 experiments used this particular survey. In the mortality 
attitudes personality survey, people are asked to write about “what will happen to them as they 
physically die, and . . . the emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them" 
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989, p. 682). 
The other death-related surveys that researchers have used are not that different from the 
mortality attitudes personality survey. For example, some items from Boyar’s (1964) fear of 
death scale contain statements such as, “I am not at all disturbed by the finality of death.” and 
“The total isolation of death is frightening to me.” (p. 82). Also similar to the mortality attitudes 
personality survey, some items from Conte et al.’s (1982) death-anxiety scale contain questions 
such as, “Do you worry about dying?” and “Does it bother you that you may die before you have 
done everything you wanted to?” (p. 779). These surveys operationalized reminders of death 
similar to that of the mortality attitudes personality survey, that is, people are asked to consider 
what happens to them in death.  
Other explicit reminders of death share characteristics with the mortality attitudes 
personality survey. For example, Baka et al. (2012) reminded people of their mortality by having 
them view pictures related to death, then write down their thoughts associated with experiencing 
death. Baldwin and Wesley (1996) had people read a passage about death, asked them to point 
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out specific portions of the passage, and then asked them to write about their thoughts associated 
with the portion they pointed out. Baldwin and Wesley found that the passages used could 
sufficiently remind people of death similar to that of other death reminding procedures.  
Implicit and naturally occurring reminders of death may also fit under a facing-death 
conceptualization, but it is indeterminate because of the indirect nature in which death is thought 
to be evoked. For instance, people are not asked about questions directly related to death, but are 
reminded of death subliminally (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997; Maxfield et al., 2007) or may be 
assumed to be reminded of death when walking through or by a cemetery or funeral home (e.g., 
Gailloit et al., 2008; Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). This makes it unclear 
how broadly or narrowly the person is thinking about death. 
Life-in-the-face-of-death. A procedure used to remind people of death that 
operationalizes death as life-in-the-face-of-death is Cozzolino, Staples, Meyers, and Samboceti’s 
(2004) “death reflection” procedure. Cozzolino et al. created the death reflection procedure based 
on reports from people who experienced a “near death experience”. They described near death 
experiences as a close call with death or an instance where people are pronounced clinically 
dead. Cozzolino et al. argued that near death experiences typically make people see mortality as 
a real concern, which in turn makes them reflect on their lives. Their manipulation of making 
people aware of death involved having people read a scenario that places them in a near death 
experience. After people read the scenario, they are asked to: “(a) Please describe in detail the 
thoughts and emotions you felt while imagining the scenario (b) If you did experience this event, 
how do you think you would handle the final moments? (c) Again, imagining it did happen to 
you, describe the life you led up to that point. (d) How do you feel your family would react if it 
did happen to you?” (p. 281).  
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Another procedure that operationalizes death in keeping with a life-in-the-face-of-death 
conceptualization of death is Cozzolino, Sheldon, Schachtman, and Meyers’s (2009) “limited 
time perspective”. In this procedure, Cozzolino et al. asked participants to “Imagine it is now the 
future and that you are 75 years old. Although you are healthy, you do realize your life is in its 
final stage. In as many words and in as much detail as possible, please describe the thoughts, 
feelings, and emotions you would experience at this age when thinking about death” (p. 402). 
Comparing the life-in-the-face-of-death and facing-death procedures reveal several 
differences about how death can be conceptualized. Cozzolino et al. (2004) and Frias, Watkins, 
Webber, and Froh (2011) argued that a reminder of death by death reflection (life-in-the-face-of-
death), unlike the mortality attitudes personality survey (facing-death), might be associated with 
people confronting death in a more personal and non-abstract manner.  
Cozzolino et al. (2004) and Lykins, Segerstrom, Averill, Evans, and Kemeny (2007) 
provided evidence for the differences in concerns related to death between people reminded of 
death by death reflection (life-in-the-face-of-death) and the mortality attitudes personality survey 
(facing-death). Cozzolino et al. (2004) and Lykins et al. (2007) reported that people reminded of 
death by death reflection reflected on their lives, reflected on their regrets in life, and thought 
about others more than people reminded of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey. 
Cozzolino et al. provided evidence that people who were reminded of death by death reflection 
thought about death, the inevitability of death, and themselves less than people who were 
reminded of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey. Lykins et al. found that people 
reminded of death by death reflection thought about the reality of death, life after death, and the 
inevitability of death less than people who were reminded of death by the mortality attitudes 
personality survey.  
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If people think about others and their regrets in life when reminded of death by death 
reflection (i.e., a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure), there might be differential effects between 
death reflection and the mortality attitudes personality survey (i.e., a facing-death procedure). 
Death reflection might be a procedure that is keeping in line with the anxiety buffering 
hypothesis whereas a reminder by the mortality attitudes personality survey might not be. For 
instance, people reminded of death by death reflection might consider how well they have lived 
up to their cultural worldview or consider how their actions affected their close relationships. On 
the other hand, people reminded of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey might be 
more focused on death itself and ignoring the strength of their anxiety buffering structures at the 
time. Thus, people who are reminded of death by death reflection (life-in-the-face-of-death) 
might experience lower levels anxiety compared to people who are reminded of death by the 
mortality attitudes personality survey (facing death). 
Further, Cozzolino et al.’s (2009) limited time perspective (life-in-the-face-of-death) 
accounts for people’s lives leading up to their death unlike the mortality attitudes personality 
survey (facing-death). Cozzolino et al. suggested that the mortality attitudes personality survey 
might be associated with what they called an “open perspective of time” because there is no 
indication of time described in the survey. Cozzolino et al. reasoned that people who perceive 
that their time is limited might be more concerned for others and more concerned for 
understanding their place in the world. Cozzolino et al. (2009) further contended from 
socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) 
that how people perceive time affects the types of goals they pursue. Cozzolino et al. argued that 
people with an open perspective of time might experience amplified extrinsic goals, whereas 
people with a limited perspective of time might experience amplified non-extrinsic goals. Goals 
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that are extrinsic are goals that are motivated by external factors (e.g., a person forgiving a 
sibling because a parent said so), whereas goals that are non-extrinsic are motivated by non-
external factors (e.g., a person forgiving a sibling because he or she wants to let go of his or her 
negative emotions).  
Cozzolino et al. (2004) and Cozzolino et al. (2009) provided a different way to think 
about death, such that, people might have other thoughts besides exclusively thinking about 
death or the act of dying. Cozzolino (2006) argued that reminding people of death in a more 
realistic manner might reflect people who go through a near death encounter or reflect people 
who are approaching their mortality. Reminding people of death in a more realistic manner (i.e., 
reminders of one’s life leading up to death) might bring death to a more concrete level of 
abstraction. If people experience death at a concrete level, they might have other considerations 
besides exclusively thinking about death. I would argue that this is like the distinction I have 
made with a life-in-the-face-of-death conceptualization compared to a facing-death 
conceptualization of death. Life-in-the-face-of-death might give people a broader perspective of 
death, such that, people might think about death while also reflecting on their lives.  
Indeed, scholars outside of the terror management theory framework have found evidence 
that people think about more than death as they approach their inevitable end. Katz, Saadon-
Grosman, and Arzyttt (2017) described that people who have a near death encounter experience 
a vivid review of their lives. Generous and Keeley (2014) found that participants frequently 
reported that in their final conversation with a loved one who was dying, they reminisced about 
their favorite moments together. Generous and Keeley also reported that in people’s final 
conversations, the dying will express messages about love, religion, and a reflection on 
themselves and attempt to engage in small talk, reconcile a strained relationship, and talk about 
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their impending death. Based on Generous and Keeley’s findings, people who are dying seem to 
be thinking of the lasting impact that they have or could have on other people before they die. 
How Reminders of Death Affect Attitudes and Behaviors 
Tests of the mortality salience hypothesis are largely associated with operationalizing 
death as facing-death. Researchers using a facing-death procedure have generally found that 
people were more defensive toward dissimilar others or evaluated dissimilar others more 
negatively when reminded of death as opposed to not being reminded of death (e.g., Greenberg 
et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 1994; Greenberg, Arndt, et al. 2000; Rosenblatt et al. 1989; Simon 
et al., 1998). Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, and Van Yperen (2008) found that people negatively 
stereotype others more when reminded of death by a facing-death procedure compared to not 
being reminded of death. More recent evidence (e.g., Weise et al., 2012; Leippe et al., 2016) was 
associated with similar effects, such that people were less tolerant of culturally dissimilar others 
when reminded of death by a facing-death procedure compared to not being reminded of death. 
There are, however, a few studies that provided some evidence of the association 
between reminders of death (via a facing-death procedure) and positive attitudes, such as 
evaluating dissimilar others less negatively (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 
Chatel, 1992) or a positive behavior such as helping others (Jonas et al., 2008). But, this less 
negative evaluation or helping others only occurred under specific conditions. Greenberg et al., 
for instance, found that people who were liberal would evaluate dissimilar others less negatively 
than conservatives when reminded of death. Reminding people of death and priming them to 
think about their romantic partner (Cox et al., 2008; Mikulincer et al., 2003), parents (Cox et al., 
2008; Hart et al., 2005), or friends (Cox et al., 2008) is also associated with a less negative 
evaluation of a culturally dissimilar other than those who are not primed to think about those 
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relationships. Jonas et al. reported that people who were primed to be helpful and were reminded 
of death were more helpful toward children than musicians. Jonas et al. also described that 
people who were reminded of death and primed to be helpful were more helpful toward children 
than those who were not reminded of death.  
The few studies that compared a facing-death procedure to a life-in-the-face-of-death 
procedure found that the procedures were sometimes associated with different outcomes. 
Cozzolino et al. (2004), for instance, found that people who were high on extrinsic value 
orientation were less greedy when reminded of death by the death reflection manipulation (life-
in-the-face-of-death) than those who were reminded of death by the mortality attitudes 
personality survey (facing-death). Frias et al. (2011) reported that there were no differences in 
people’s gratefulness when people were reminded of death by either death reflection or the 
mortality attitudes personality survey. However, Frias et al.’s further analysis revealed that 
people who were reminded of death by death reflection had a significant change in gratitude, 
whereas those reminded of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey had no significant 
change in gratitude. These differences may be due to the perspective that is evoked in the 
different death manipulations, with one being fairly narrow in scope when one thinks about death 
and the act of dying (facing-death) and one being more broad in scope when one thinks about 
death, one’s life, and how one’s death might affect others (life-in-the-face-of-death). 
Changes in perspective do appear to be related to different outcomes. Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Richeson, and Galinsky (2011) reported that perspective taking is associated with 
people being less racially discriminant toward others. Vescio, Schrist, and Paolucci (2003) 
described that when people were encouraged to take the perspective of others as opposed to not, 
they were less stereotypical of a dissimilar other. Noor and Halabi (2018) found that participants 
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who took the perspective of a cultural outgroup militant member were more willing to forgive 
than those who did not take the outgroup member’s perspective. Thus, if people do take the 
perspective of others when reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure, people 
might have attitudes and behaviors that might be more geared toward creating a harmonious 
relationship with others. 
As discussed, there are different outcomes associated with reminding people of death in 
different ways. Evidence from researchers currently suggests that people who are reminded of 
death by a facing-death procedure might be more greedy (Cozzolino et al., 2004; Cozzolino et 
al., 2009), more ethnocentric (Weise et al., 2012), and more prejudicial toward others (Leippe et 
al., 2016). This might be because people who are reminded of death by a facing-death procedure 
might be thinking about death at a more abstract level and that they might not be considering 
other factors besides death. If people are thinking about death at a more abstract level, they might 
perceive that they have a lot of time left when thoughts of death are evoked by a facing-death 
procedure.  Additionally, because there is no indication of how long people have left to live 
when reminders of death are operationalized by this type, some might view thoughts of death as 
a theoretical exercise rather than concretely facing the reality. People then might be more 
extrinsically value oriented because they perceive that they have a lot of time left when reminded 
of death by a facing-death procedure. 
On the other hand, people reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of death procedure 
might be associated with people seeming to be more geared toward maintaining their 
relationships with others. If people have a near death encounter, they might have a review of 
their life flash before their eyes. A life review experience might be associated with a greater 
appreciation for life’s wonders and joys and a greater sense of value toward the relationships that 
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people developed in their life. If people have a sense that their time is limited, they might be 
concerned about how best to spend the rest of their days with other people rather than the act of 
dying itself. People might also be more focused on how to resolve any troubled relationships 
when thinking that their time is limited. People who have a greater appreciation or consider that 
their time is limited might try to spend more time with their loved ones and reflect on all their 
achievements and pursuits when reminded of death in this way. Thus, it is possible that a 
reminder of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure might be associated with people acting 
more benevolently toward others. 
How Reminders of Death Affect Forgiveness and Apology Acceptance 
Forgiveness and the related concept of apology acceptance are two constructs that might 
be influenced by reminders of death. Researchers that study forgiveness have found that people 
who forgive might see transgressors in a more positive light or might act toward transgressors in 
a more prosocial or socially constructive manner (Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; McCullough, 
Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). Scholars have also found that forgiveness is associated with 
improved mental health (Toussaint, Shields, & Slavich, 2016) reduced anger and hostility toward 
a transgressor (Lutjen, Silton, & Flannelly, 2012; Watson, Rapee, & Todorov, 2017), and lower 
levels of stress (Witvliet, Ludwig, & Laan, 2001).  
Waldron and Kelley (2008) defined forgiveness as a relationally based process in which 
the transgressed, transgressor, or both acknowledge that one has acted in a harmful manner, and 
that the transgressed expresses undeserved compassion to the transgressor, followed by either or 
both persons moving toward a positive psychological state. Forgiveness is further characterized 
as an important part of the relational repair and maintenance process (Waldron & Kelley, 2008; 
Rusbult, Hanon, Stocker, & Finkel, 2005; Worthington, 2005). This is because the act of 
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forgiving can lead to lower levels of anger and hostility toward a transgressor that people have a 
relationship with (Lutjen et al., 2012; Watson et al., 2017). 
Darby and Schlenecker (1982) defined an apology as social tool that a transgressor uses 
to acknowledge that he or she committed an act that might have caused pain toward the 
transgressed. Hareli and Eisikovits (2006) described that an apology is a message that expresses 
remorse if people transgressed someone. Said differently, an apology is a transgressor’s way of 
identifying what he or she did wrong and an attempt at repairing the damaged relationship.  
Apology acceptance can be defined as a relational maintenance process that 
acknowledges a transgressor’s forgiveness seeking effort without a person having moved from a 
negative to positive psychological state. People might accept an apology in attempt to maintain 
social harmony, as demonstrating hostility toward a transgressor might bring unwanted attention 
to the transgressed. Accepting an apology might also be one way for people who were 
transgressed to maintain, manage, or restore their impression in the presence of others. 
Researchers have also found that people are more willing to forgive if a transgressor 
apologizes (Darby & Schlenecker, 1982; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi, 
Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983).  Thus far, researchers have studied 
forgiveness and apology acceptance as the same construct (Strickland, Martin, Allan, & Allan, 
2018). But some researchers have found evidence that people view forgiving as different from 
accepting an apology. Dhami (2012), for instance, found that people who were transgressed were 
more willing to accept an apology but less willing to forgive. Strickland et al. reported that lay 
people viewed apology acceptance as a tool used to acknowledge a transgressor’s forgiveness 
seeking effort, whereas forgiveness was viewed as a process that people go through to forgo the 
feelings associated with a transgression.  Strickland further discussed apology acceptance as a 
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decision-making based process, in that, people can decide to accept an apology whereas people 
are not necessarily able to decide to move from a negative to positive psychological state. Based 
on this discussion, the willingness to forgive and the willingness to accept an apology will be 
examined as two separate constructs. 
Terror management scholars have provided a rich history on how a reminder of death can 
affect people. Currently, the resultant attitudes and behaviors found when testing the propositions 
of terror management theory are more negative in nature, however, this might be because of the 
way that terror management researchers have conceptualized death. Moreover, current findings 
on resultant attitudes and behaviors that are more positive in nature are contingent on moderators 
being present (e.g., priming of a romantic partner, family member, best friend, or prosocial 
behavior). Thus, I offer that conceptualizing death in a different way, that is “life-in-the-face-of-
death”, might be associated with resultant attitudes and behaviors that are more positive in 
nature. A behavior of interest that might be directly affected by a reminder of death is the 
willingness to forgive and the related concept of the willingness to accept an apology. 
If people are not exclusively thinking about death when reminded of death by a life-in-
the-face-of-death procedure, they might be more willing to forgive and accept an apology 
compared to people who are reminded of death by a facing-death procedure. Past research 
indicates that people might have other thoughts besides exclusively thinking about death (e.g., 
Cozzolino et al., 2004; Lykins et al., 2007). This thinking might be associated with people being 
more focused on non-extrinsically oriented goals rather than extrinsically oriented goals. If 
people are more non-extrinsically oriented when reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death 
procedure, they might perceive forgiving a transgressor and accepting a transgressor’s apology 
as beneficial and worthwhile over holding onto the hurt associated with the transgression. 
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Further, people who are reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure might 
shift beyond their own perspective that is exclusively focused on death and their dying. If 
people’s perspectives shift in this manner, their perspective on a transgression or hurtful event 
could shift as well to something more than the effects of the transgression on themselves. A 
different perspective might mean thinking about a transgression from the transgressor’s point of 
view or considering a transgression from the perspective of an uninvolved third party. People 
who take a different perspective rather than their own might allow them to recognize that 
everyone makes mistakes or that the transgressed is also capable of engaging in a transgression. 
Taking other people’s perspectives might also lead people to finding new ways to better 
understand where they stand in the world and how they can make their social environment more 
positive. People might be more inclined to recognize the value in having relationships with 
others, even with those others who had hurt them at one point in the past. Thus, a reminder of 
death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure might be associated with people being more 
willing to forgive and more willing to accept an apology. 
The current empirical evidence, while not a direct test of forgiveness and apologies does 
tend to support this conjecture.  For example, Frias et al. (2011) reported that a reminder of death 
by death reflection (life-in-the-face-of-death) is associated with a direct influence on people’s 
gratitude, whereas there was no change in people’s gratitude when reminded of death by the 
mortality attitudes personality survey (facing-death). Schimel, Wohl, and Williams (2006) found 
that people, who were reminded of death by mortality attitudes personality survey compared to 
those who were not reminded of death, were less willing to forgive when the target of 
forgiveness was of a different cultural ingroup from the forgiver. Schimel et al. also reported that 
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people who were low on degree of trait empathy were also less willing to forgive when reminded 
of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey compared to no death reminder.  
The willingness to forgive and the willingness to accept an apology might be affected 
differently by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure compared to a facing-death procedure in the 
context of people’s close or committed relationships. Van Tongeren, Green, Davis, Worthington, 
and Reid (2013) examined how a reminder of death by the mortality attitudes personality survey 
(a facing-death procedure) would influence people’s willingness to forgive if they were very 
close or highly committed to the target of forgiveness. Van Tongeren et al. found that people 
who reported being more committed to an offender than those who were less committed, were 
more willing to forgive when reminded of death compared to people who were not reminded of 
death. They provided evidence that people who are in very close or highly committed 
relationships can be influenced by a reminder of death on their willingness to forgive. But, van 
Tongeren et al. did not examine how different reminders of death influence can influence people 
in those types of relationships on their willingness to forgive. 
In sum, terror management researchers proposed that people manage the anxiety 
associated with the awareness of death through the anxiety buffering structures (i.e., cultural 
worldview, self-esteem, and close relationships) and a dual component terror management 
defense. Evidence in support of terror management theory indicates that people act negatively 
toward others when reminded of death, however, this might have been due to the way that terror 
management researchers have conceptualized death, which I offered as “facing-death”. Here, I 
offer a different way of thinking about death which I titled “life-in-the-face-of-death”, which 
includes thinking about life while thinking about death. A life-in-the-face-of-death procedure 
might be associated with a more willingness to forgive and accept an apology because people 
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might be attributing a greater sense of value to their relationships with other people due to 
thinking about emotional goals, considering the living while recognizing their death, or 
considering the limited time they have left. Therefore, I would expect that people will be more 
willing behave in socially constructive ways, such as accepting an apology and forgiving 
following a hurtful event, when primed to think of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure 
as compared to those who are primed to think of death with a facing-death procedure.  
H1: People who are reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure will be 
more willing to forgive than people who are reminded of death by a facing-death 
procedure. 
H2: People who are reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure will be 
more willing to accept an apology than people who are reminded of death by a facing-
death procedure. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants (n = 175) were recruited from undergraduate Communicology courses at the 
University of Hawai’i at Mānoa using Sona, an online participant recruitment website. 
Participation took approximately 30 minutes and participation was completely voluntary. 
Participants were compensated with course credit or extra credit in their Communicology 
courses. Of the participants, 86 (49%) reported to be male, 87 (49%) reported to be female, and 2 
(1.2%) preferred not to disclose a gender. Age of the participants ranged from 18 to 30 years old 
(M = 20.70, SD = 2.55). Participants ranged from being a first year undergraduate student to 
being in school for 5 years or more; 71 (40%) reported to be a first year, 42 (24%) reported to be 
a second year, 27 (15%) reported to be a third year, 25 (14%) reported to be a fourth year, and 10 
(5.7%) reported to be in school for 5 years or more. Participants on average were extremely 
comfortable with English (1 = extremely uncomfortable to 7 = extremely comfortable; M = 6.83, 
SD = 0.51). 
Procedure  
After students consented to participate (see Appendix A), they were randomly assigned to 
one of four versions of an online survey. Each version of the survey differed in their priming 
conditions. People were reminded of death in two of the priming conditions, whereas people 
were not reminded of death in the other two priming conditions. The rest of the survey questions, 
across all four versions of the survey, were exactly the same.  
After participants were primed, they completed a distraction task because researchers 
have found that a reminder of death is stronger after a delay between the reminder and the 
outcome variable of interest (e.g., Abeyta et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 2000). Steinman and 
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Updegraff (2015) noted that the strongest delay is after completing 3 tasks or approximately 8 
minutes between priming condition and the outcome variable of interest.  
Following the distraction task, participants described an event where they felt that they 
were hurt by another person’s actions and they scored how hurtful the event was. Participants 
then answered questions about their willingness to accept an apology from the person that caused 
the hurtful event, their willingness to forgive the person who had caused the hurtful event, and 
their level of trait empathy as a possible moderator in this study (Schimel et al., 2006; Van 
Tongeren et al., 2013). Participants also answered several questions about their demographic 
(i.e., age, gender, class standing, and comfort with English).  
 Participants were asked questions related to past forgiveness and past apology acceptance 
(see Appendix B). Participants were asked whether the person they described had apologized to 
them in the past (Yes, No, or I do not recall), whether they had accepted that person’s apology 
(Yes or No), and the extent to which they had forgiven that person (1 = not at all to 5 = 
completely forgiven). 
Participants received a debriefing statement after completion of the questionnaire. This 
debriefing statement included a video to have think about more positive thoughts, information 
regarding access to the university’s counseling office, and other resources (see Appendix C). 
Materials 
Priming conditions. Two of the priming conditions were reminders of death and the 
other two priming conditions were control conditions. Participants were reminded of death by 
completing either Cozzolino et al.’s (2004) death reflection (life-in-the-face-of-death) or 
Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) mortality attitudes personality survey (facing-death). Participants in 
one control condition were asked to read a scenario similarly worded to the death reflection 
  
 
29 
procedure which was called the “normal day reflection” (life-in-the-face-of-death control). 
Participants in the other condition were asked to fill out a similarly worded version of the 
mortality attitudes personality survey that was called the “dental pain attitudes personality 
survey” (facing-death control). 
Life-in-the-face-of-death. Cozzolino et al.’s (2004) death reflection manipulation (see 
Appendix D) was used as the life-in-the-face-of-death prompt to evoke thoughts of death. 
Participants read about a hypothetical near death experience (i.e., being trapped in a burning 
building) and were informed that their personality will be assessed based on their responses to 
this scenario. After reading the scenario, participants were asked four open-ended questions, 
including, “again, imagining it did happen to you, describe the life you led up to that point” and 
“how do you feel your family would react if it did happen to you?”  
Facing-death. Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) mortality attitudes personality survey was used 
as the facing-death prompt.  This survey involved evoking thoughts of death posing two open-
ended questions to participants. Participants were also informed that their personality will be 
assessed based on the content of their responses. Participants were specifically asked to describe 
in as much detail as possible: “(a) what will happen to them as they physically die, and (b) the 
emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989, p. 682).  
Life-in-the-face-of-death control. Participants in this control condition (see Appendix E) 
were not reminded of death, instead they were asked to read through a scenario that placed them 
in a day where they spent time sightseeing with a family member while visiting a friend 
(Cozzolino et al., 2004). Participants were informed that their personality will be assessed based 
on the content of their open-ended responses to a hypothetical normal day scenario. After 
participants read through the scenario, they were asked four open ended questions concerning 
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their responses to the prompt. The same questions from “death reflection” were used in this 
control condition.  
Facing-death control. Participants in this control condition were primed to think about 
being in pain caused by a dental procedure (Routledge & Arndt, 2010; Routledge, Arndt, Vess, 
& Sheldon, 2008). Participants were informed that their personality will be assessed based on the 
content of their open-ended responses to extreme physical pain caused by a root canal. 
Participants assigned to this condition were asked two open ended questions in which they 
described in as much detail as possible: (a) what will happen to them as they experience pain 
from a root canal and (b) the emotions that the thought of pain from a root canal arouses in them.  
Distraction task. As a distraction task, participants reported on their mood and 
completed a crossword puzzle. The crossword puzzle was on a topic unrelated to death. 
Mood measurement. Watson et al.’s (1998) positive and negative affective schedule (see 
Appendix F) was used to assess mood. Watson et al.’s questionnaire measured people’s mood on 
20 different items. The scale was separated into two sub-scales each with 10-items in each sub-
scale. One sub-scale measured positive mood and the other that measures negative mood. Some 
sample items that measured positive mood were “interested” and “excited”. Some sample items 
that measured negative mood were “distressed” and “upset”. Participants were informed that 
their mood was being assessed because certain personalities might have different responses as a 
result of certain stimuli. Participants were asked to rate how they felt according to a specific 
word. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = does not describe me at all to 7 
= describes me very well) of how they felt according to the specific item at the time of taking the 
survey. Participants reported being in a moderately positive mood (M = 4.19, SD = 1.37). 
Participants also reported being in somewhat of a negative mood (M =2.92, SD = 1.28). 
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Reliability for the positive mood and negative mood measures reached acceptable levels, α = .92 
and α = .90, respectively. Results of a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test showed that 
there were no significant differences among priming conditions on people’s reported positive 
mood, F(3, 171) = 1.31, p = .28. Results of a one-way ANOVA also showed that there were no 
significant differences among priming conditions on people’s reported negative mood, F(3, 171) 
= 1.33, p = .27. 
Crossword puzzle. The crossword puzzle used was developed for this particular study 
(see Appendix G). The topic addressed in the crossword was soda brands (e.g., Crush, Pepsi, and 
Coke) to serve as a neutral topic that avoided sensitizing participants to any of the key variables 
of this study. Participants were informed that their personality will be assessed based on how 
many words they can solve in the crossword puzzle and were told they were not required to 
complete the crossword. Participants were asked to solve the puzzle by filling in answers in 
provided textboxes. Answers for the crossword puzzle were provided on the subsequent page.  
Hurtful event disclosure writing prompt. Participants were prompted to write about a 
transgression using an adapted version of Van Tongeren et al.’s (2013) prompt (see Appendix 
H). In Van Tongeren et al.’s prompt, participants were asked to think about someone who had 
deeply hurt or offended them. For this study, the prompt was adapted by adding examples of 
hurtful events that might cause negative feelings. Participants described a variety of hurtful 
events such as a romantic partner having cheated on them, a friend that shut them out, a parent 
being distant from them, or a bully having picked on them. Of the participants, 77 (45%) 
reported a hurtful event caused by a current or former romantic partner, 51 (29%) reported a 
hurtful event caused by a friend or former friend, 17 (10%) reported a hurtful event caused by a 
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family member, and 28 (16%) reported a hurtful event caused by someone they had not had a 
relationship with.  
Additionally, participants were asked to describe how hurtful the event was using a 3-
item survey that asked about the participants feelings at the time in which the event was 
happening and their current feelings.  Specifically, participants responded to three 7-point 
semantic differential scales related to hurt, anger, and sadness (e.g., 1 = extremely not hurt to 7 = 
extremely hurt). The reliability of the hurt feelings in the past scale approached an acceptable 
level (α = .66) and the reliability of the hurt feelings in the present scale reached an acceptable 
level (α = .81). Scores were averaged for each time frame with higher scores indicating being 
more hurt in response to the hurtful event described. Participants reported feeling very hurt in the 
past, (M = 6.15, SD = 1.07), and reported feeling somewhat hurt in the present, (M =3.23, SD = 
1.70). Results of a one-way ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences among 
priming conditions on people’s reported feelings of hurt in the past, F(3, 170) = 0.35, p = .80. 
Results of a one-way ANOVA also showed that there were no significant differences among 
priming conditions on people’s reported feelings of hurt in the present, F(3, 171) = 1.75, p = .16. 
Willingness to accept an apology.  To measure people’s willingness to accept an 
apology, a 5-item questionnaire, based on Strickland et al.’s (2018) findings on how lay persons 
defined apology acceptance was created for this study (see Appendix I). Participants were asked, 
on a 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = highly disagree to 7 = highly agree), about how much they 
agreed with the statement provided. Some statements from this measure were “If that person 
tried to apologize to me, I would be willing to accept that person’s apology” and “If that person 
apologizes, that person is willing to admit responsibility for his/her actions”.  Higher average 
scores indicated a greater reported willingness to accept the described transgressor’s apology. 
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Participants on average reported being moderately willing to accept an apology (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.56). Reliability of the apology acceptance scale reached an acceptable level, α = .82.  
Willingness to forgive. McCullough, Rusbult, and Cohen’s (2006) 18-item transgression 
related interpersonal motivations inventory (see Appendix J) was used to measure participants’ 
willingness to forgive. The measure assessed people’s motivation to forgive after participants 
had described a particular transgression. The inventory was separated into three different sub-
scales that examined a person’s motivation to enact revenge on the transgressor (Revenge), to 
avoid the transgressor (Avoidance), and to act benevolent toward a transgressor (Benevolence).  
Participants were asked to describe, using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = highly disagree 
to 7 = highly agree), how much they agreed with the statements provided. Some sample items 
from the revenge sub-scale were “I’ll make him/her pay” and “I wish that something bad would 
happen to him/her”. Some sample items from the avoidance sub-scale were “I am trying to keep 
as much distance between us as possible” and “I’d live as if he/she doesn’t exist/ isn’t around”. 
Some sample items from the benevolent sub-scale were “I have given up my hurt and 
resentment” and “Even though his/her actions hurt me, I still have goodwill for him/her”.  
Items from the revenge and avoidance sub-scales were reverse scored so that higher 
scores indicated a higher willingness to forgive (i.e., less revenge and less avoidance tendencies). 
After reverse scoring, all scores were averaged with higher average scores indicating that a 
participant had a stronger reported willingness to forgive the transgressor. 
Participants on average reported being moderately willing to forgive (M = 4.48, SD = 
1.25), with the scale’s reliability reaching an acceptable level, α = .91. Participants in the 
unwillingness to enact revenge subscale reported being almost entirely unwilling to enact 
revenge (M = 5.97, SD = 1.24), with the subscale’s reliability reaching an acceptable level, α = 
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.84. Additionally, participants in the unwillingness to avoid subscale reported being moderately 
unwilling to avoid (M = 4.00, SD= 1.78), with the subscale’s reliability reaching an acceptable 
level, α = .91. Lastly, participants in the willingness act benevolent subscale reported report 
being moderately willing to act benevolently (M = 3.81, SD = 1.54), with the willingness to act 
benevolently subscale’s reliability reaching an acceptable level α = .86. 
 Trait empathy assessment. An adapted version of Davis’s (1980) interpersonal 
reactivity inventory (see Appendix K) was used to measure people’s degree of trait empathy. The 
interpersonal reactivity inventory contains 28-items and four different sub-scales, with each sub-
scale having 7-items. These subscales measure people’s ability to adopt another person’s 
perspective (perspective-taking), people’s capacity to express concern for other individuals 
(empathic concern), people’s ability to transport themselves into fictional situations (fantasy), 
and people’s feelings of anxiety or discomfort toward other’s negative experiences (personal 
distress).  For this study, people’s trait empathy using the perspective-taking and empathic 
concern sub-scales were assessed.  
 Participants were asked, using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = does not describe me at all 
to 7 = describes me very well), how well each statement described them. Some sample items 
from the perspective-taking sub-scale were “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective”, and “I believe that there are two sides to 
every question and try to look at them both”. Some sample items from the empathic concern sub-
scale were “I am often quite touched by things that I see happen”, and “I would describe myself 
as a pretty soft-hearted person”.  
All scores were averaged with higher scores indicating that a participant reported having 
a higher degree of trait empathy. Participants reported having a tendency to be mostly empathetic 
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(M = 5.13 SD = 0.84), with reliability of the overall trait empathy scale reaching an acceptable 
level, α = .80. Participants also reported having a moderate tendency to take the perspectives of 
other people (M = 5.02, SD = 0.96), with the perspective-taking subscale’s reliability reaching an 
acceptable level, α = .71. Lastly, participants reported having a moderate tendency to express 
concern for others (M = 5.24, SD = 0.96), with the empathic concern subscale’s reliability 
reaching an acceptable level, α = .72. Results of a one-way ANOVA showed that there were no 
significant differences among priming conditions on people’s degree of trait empathy, F(3, 171) 
= 0.58, p = .95. Results of a one-way ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences 
among priming conditions on people’s reported ability to take others’ perspectives, F(3, 171) = 
0.12, p = .96. Results of a one-way ANOVA also showed that there were no significant 
differences among priming conditions on people’s ability to express concern for others F(3, 171) 
= 1.07, p =  .37. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 The central predictions of this study were that a reminder of death would influence 
people’s willingness to forgive and accept an apology. Participants (n = 52) were included in the 
tests of the hypotheses (the final sample) if they reported that they had not fully forgiven the 
transgressor and if they had not accepted an apology from the transgressor in the past (see Table 
1 for demographic information and Table 2 for mood, hurt, and empathy in final sample).  
Specifically, participants who were included in the analyses reported having not forgiven at all or 
having forgiven a little in combination with having not been offered an apology, not accepted an 
apology when an apology was offered, and not recalling whether an apology was offered. All 
tests were conducted using a p = .05 level to determine significance. 
Hypothesis 1 
 
 Hypothesis 1 was the prediction in which people who were reminded of death by a life-
in-the-face-of-death procedure would be more willing to forgive than people who were reminded 
of death by a facing-death procedure. A one-way ANOVA with planned comparisons between 
participants who were reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-death procedure (n = 13) and 
who were reminded of death by a facing-death procedure (n = 12) on their willingness to forgive 
was conducted. Planned comparisons revealed that participants in the facing-death condition (M 
= 2.76, SD = 0.92) were significantly more unwilling to forgive than participants in the life-in-
the-face-of-death (M = 3.49, SD = 1.12) condition; t(48) = 2.06, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .71 (see 
Table 3). The results of the analyses provided support for hypothesis 1. 
 Supplemental tests. To provide further insight, several additional analyses were 
conducted, including a one-way ANOVA and post hoc LSD tests, to examine whether there were 
differences among priming conditions on people’s willingness to forgive and to examine whether 
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differences existed among priming conditions across each willingness to forgive subscale. LSDs 
were used due to the small sample sizes among the conditions (Williams & Abdi, 2010). 
According to Keppel (1991), the LSD test is limited, in that the test does not control for type 1 or 
family wise error. To partially address this, the post hoc analyses were only conducted when the 
omnibus F-tests were significant.  
Willingness to forgive overall. In addition the overall findings reported in the direct test 
of hypothesis 1, the results also revealed a significant difference among the priming conditions 
on people’s willingness to forgive; F(3, 48) = 3.80, p = .02, ηp2 = .19 (see Table 4, for means, 
standard deviations, and LSDs). A post hoc LSD test showed that people in the facing-death 
condition reported being more unwilling to forgive than people in the facing-death control 
condition. The post hoc LSD test also revealed that people in the facing-death condition were 
more unwilling to forgive than people in the life-in-the-face-of-death control condition. 
Unwillingness to enact revenge. The results did not reveal a significant difference among 
priming conditions based on people’s unwillingness to enact revenge, F(3, 48) = 1.58, p = 
.21, ηp2 = .09 (see Table 4).  
Unwillingness to avoid. The results did not reveal a significant difference among priming 
conditions based on people’s unwillingness to avoid, F(3, 48) = 1.93, p = .14,  ηp2 = .11 (see 
Table 4). 
Willingness to act benevolently. The results revealed a significant difference among 
priming conditions based on people’s willingness to act benevolently, F(3, 48) = 3.25, p = 
.03,  ηp2 = .17 (see Table 4, for means, standard deviations, and LSDs). A post hoc LSD test 
showed that people in the facing-death condition were more unwilling to act benevolently than 
people in the facing-death control condition. A post hoc LSD test also showed that people in the 
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facing-death condition were more unwilling to act benevolently than people in the life-in-the-
face-of-death control condition. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 was the prediction in which people who were reminded of death by a life-in-
the-face-of-death procedure will be more willing to accept an apology than people who are 
reminded of death by a facing-death procedure. To test hypothesis 2, a one-way ANOVA with 
planned comparisons between participants who were reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-of-
death procedure and who were reminded of death by a facing-death procedure on their willingness 
to accept an apology was conducted. Planned comparisons revealed that participants in the facing-
death condition (M = 1.90, SD = 1.14) were significantly more unwilling to accept an apology than 
participants in the life-in-the-face-of-death condition (M = 2.96, SD = 1.40); t(48) = 2.19, p = .03, 
Cohen’s d = .84 (see Table 3). The results of the analyses provided support for hypothesis 2. 
Supplemental analyses. In addition to the main findings related to the direct test of 
hypothesis 2, post hoc LSD tests were conducted to determine whether differences appeared 
among the different priming conditions on participants’ willingness to accept an apology. The 
results of the supplemental tests revealed a significant difference among priming conditions on 
people’s willingness to accept an apology; F(3, 48) = 4.67, p < .001,  ηp2 = .23 (see Table 4, for 
means, standard deviations, and LSDs). A post hoc LSD test showed that people in the facing-
death condition were more unwilling to accept an apology than people in the facing-death control 
condition. The post hoc LSD test also showed that people in the facing-death condition were 
more unwilling to accept an apology than people in the life-in-the-face-of-death control 
condition.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
This investigation was undertaken to examine whether there were differential effects 
between two ways in which thoughts of death can be evoked. Burke et al. (2010) noted that a 
reminder of death was typically associated with people acting in ways that served to validate 
their views or served themselves. Examined in this study was the possibility that people might 
have been more self-serving due to the way terror management researchers primed thoughts of 
death. To explore this possibility, the typical manner used to prime death thoughts was compared 
with an operationalization of death that encompassed a reminder of death as life-in-the-face-of-
death. The typical manner of priming thoughts of death (i.e., facing-death) was argued to be 
associated with people focused exclusively on death, whereas life-in-the-face-of-death procedure 
was reasoned to be associated with people thinking about their lives while focused on death. 
Evoking thoughts of death using a life-in-the-face-of-death prompt was expected to be associated 
with people being more willing to forgive and to accept an apology than a reminder of death by 
the typical manner that researchers have used.  
 The results revealed, as predicted, that people who were reminded of death by a facing-
death procedure reported being more unwilling to forgive and more unwilling to accept an 
apology from someone who had hurt them than people reminded of death by a life-in-the-face-
of-death procedure. Although Burke et al. (2010) found in their meta-analysis that there seemed 
to be no significant differences among the ways terror management researchers have reminded 
people of death, this investigation provides some evidence to the contrary. 
 As argued, the life-in-the-face-of-death prompt might have shifted people toward being 
more non-extrinsically value oriented as opposed to the facing-death prompt, due to the 
characteristic of a life-in-the-face-of-death prompt being less abstract than a facing-death 
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prompt. The life-in-the-face-of-death prompt used in this study involved asking participants to 
consider how they might die and when they might die, indicating that their time was limited. 
People who perceive that their time is limited might have viewed forgiveness and apology 
acceptance as worthwhile behaviors over holding on to their feelings of hurt because their values 
had shifted. 
 Additionally, as was argued, the study’s findings might reflect people’s change in 
perspective due to the life-in-the-face-of-death prompt because this death reminder method gives 
people the opportunity to consider their current and past relationships. If people are thinking 
about their current and past relationships, their perspective on a hurtful event could shift to the 
person who caused the hurtful event, which then might lead to reflecting on the value of the 
relationship they have or had with that person, as compared to those who are not directly 
prompted to do so. Thus, people whose perspective was directed to consider their relationships 
with others might be more inclined to engage in relational repair strategies such as being 
forgiving and being accepting of an apology.  
Implications 
 
Even though the focus of this study was on the comparison between two death reminder 
primes, the findings of this investigation also provided further evidence in support of the 
mortality salience hypothesis. Previous evidence from tests of the mortality salience hypothesis 
(e.g., Leippe et al., 2016; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Weise et al., 2012) showed that thoughts of 
death were associated with people acting in a more self-serving manner toward others when they 
are reminded of death. Consistent with those results, this study found that people who reflected 
exclusively on death (facing-death) were more self-serving (i.e., more unwilling to forgive and to 
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accept an apology) than people who reflected on dental pain (facing-death control) or on a 
normal day (life-in-the-face-of-death control).  
Intriguingly, there were no differences between people in the facing-death control or life-
in-the-face-of-death control and people who reflected on possibly dying due to a near-death 
experience (life-in-the-face-of-death) on their reported willingness to forgive and to accept an 
apology. There might have been no differences between the facing-death control or life-in-the-
face-of-death control and the life-in-the-face-of-death condition because these prompts may have 
been similar in concreteness and specificity. That is, participants who received the facing-death 
control were asked to reflect on dental pain caused by a root canal, participants who received the 
life-in-the-face-of-death control were asked to think about activities related to a visiting relative, 
and participants who received the life-in-the-face-of-death prompt were asked to reflect on a 
specific near-death experience. There also might have been no differences between the life-in-
the-face-of-death participants and life-in-the-face-of death control participants because the 
prompts from both conditions involved having people reflect on their lives and relationships.  
 There also might be a moderator effect related to people’s familiarity with the subject 
they were primed with. Evidence from other areas of literature have shown that familiarity with a 
topic is associated with changes in people’s behavior and people’s assessment of a risk (e.g., 
Hall, Ariss, & Todorov, 2007; Huberman, 2001). Among the priming conditions, participants 
who reported being the most willing to forgive and to accept an apology were in the facing-death 
control and life-in-the-face-of-death control conditions. Perhaps because people in the control 
conditions had a topic that could possibly have been familiar to them, they could better imagine 
their reactions and sentiments over less familiar topics. Participants might know, through direct 
experience, how dental pain affects them because they have visited a dentist in the past and have 
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had procedures conducted that resulted in dental pain. People might be familiar with the normal 
day scenario because they have indeed spent time and did sightseeing with visiting family 
members in the past. For people to be familiar with the topic of death, they would have likely 
had to have had a near-death experience, or perhaps been present when someone passed away.  
 Additionally, this investigation further highlighted the complexity of forgiveness as a 
variable of interest. In this study, the three dimensions of forgiveness that were examined, 
unwillingness to enact revenge, unwillingness to avoid, and willingness to be benevolent, did not 
operate in a similar manner.  There were no differences among the various priming conditions on 
reported unwillingness to enact revenge and unwillingness to avoid. However, there was 
evidence that some of the priming conditions varied on reported willingness to act benevolently 
toward the person who caused the hurtful event. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Even though findings were supportive of the predictions in this study, there are still 
limitations that occurred which warrant caution. One of these limitations was that the average 
age in the sample was 21 years old. As some scholars have found (e.g., Maxfield et al., 2007; 
Maxfield, Pyzczynski, Greenberg, & Bultmann, 2017), adults who are close to the age of 21 may 
perceive reminders of death differently than adults who are close to the age of 72. Maxfield et al. 
(2007) argued that the way a reminder of death is perceived in contrasting ways at different ages 
changes because as people get older, they are temporally closer to death.  
 Moreover, there is a body of literature describing how people who have thoughts about 
their approaching death or thoughts about death due to a near death experience (e.g., Generous & 
Keeley, 2014; Katz et al., 2017). Keeley and Generous (2015), for instance, provided evidence 
that as people are dying, they attempt to resolve issues that they have with their family members. 
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This indicates that thoughts of death seem to influence people in ways that are different from 
what terror management researchers have typically reported. Future researchers should examine 
how different operationalizations of a reminder of death might influence people’s attitudes and 
behaviors from populations that might have thoughts about death more frequently. 
 Another limitation is that many of the people who participated in this investigation were 
excluded from the analysis because they reported having forgiven and having accepted an 
apology in the past. Although results appeared to be in the right direction, exclusion of the 
participants that did not meet the criteria for tests of this study’s predictions reduced the sample 
size of each condition and reduced the power of the significance test. This could explain why 
analyses yielded results that were approaching significance in several of the supplemental tests. 
Additionally, it is difficult to generalize the findings from this study due to the reduced sample 
sizes and reduced power of the significance test. More data should be collected to assess the 
stability of the findings from this study. 
  It is also unknown as to how reminders of death influenced the excluded participants 
because their responses were not analyzed. Participants were excluded based on their self-report 
of having forgiven and accepted an apology in the past. The reality of this is that the priming 
might have influenced how they responded to questions about previous forgiveness and apology 
acceptance as these questions were asked after being primed. It is possible that the excluded 
participants’ responses might have been influenced by the reminder of death, leading them to 
answer questions in a manner that might have made them report being more forgiving in the past. 
Despite having found a significant difference between the different death reminders, researchers 
should consider asking people prior to evoking thoughts of death, as to whether or not they 
forgave and accepted an apology in response to a hurtful event in the past. However, this is not 
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without its own challenges as these sorts of questions could affect people’s thoughts about death 
as well. 
 In this study, there might have also been order effects that occurred due to the priming 
condition prompts being shown to participants prior to the hurtful event disclosure writing 
prompt. This is consistent with how terror management researchers in that they typically primed 
people to think about death then asked them to recall an event (e.g., Cox et al., 2008; Mikulincer 
et al., 2003; Van Tongeren et al., 2013). Van Tongeren et al., for example, first evoked people’s 
thoughts of death, then primed participants to think about a hurtful event that happened to them. 
But, van Tongeren et al. did not test if the thoughts of death influenced participants’ recall of an 
event. This might be an issue because a death reminder could influence how a hurtful event was 
described. To examine this possibility, researchers could counterbalance their studies, such that, 
one group could have a death reminder before the hurtful event disclosure writing, whereas 
another group could have the hurtful event disclosure writing before the death reminder. 
 One other limitation of this study was that participants described hurtful events that 
varied in severity. People in this study described a variety of hurtful events (e.g., an ex-partner 
cheated on them or a friend having not remembered to say happy birthday). People might view 
an ex-partner having cheated them as more severe than a friend forgetting to acknowledge their 
birthday. People might be less willing to forgive and less accepting of an apology depending on 
how severe they judge these hurtful events, more so if these hurtful events had some adverse 
effect on people’s anxiety-buffering structure. For instance, if an ex-partner did more damage to 
people’s self-esteem anxiety-buffering structure than an instance of forgetting to say happy 
birthday, then people might be less willing to forgive and to accept an apology forgiveness and 
apology acceptance to the ex-partner than a friend forgetting to say happy birthday. Future 
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researchers should examine how the degree of severity of an issue might mitigate the effects of a 
reminder of death on people’s willingness to forgive and accept an apology. 
 Lastly, future researchers should consider using other priming procedures that reflect a 
life-in-the-face-of-death conceptualization of death. There are many other ways in which a 
reminder of death could be operationalized as life-in-the-face-of-death. A way this can be 
accomplished is by having people reflect on being hypothetically diagnosed with a terminal 
illness with only a limited time to live. Other ways of doing this is by having people reflect on 
hypothetical near death experiences, such as, having been involved in what could be a fatal car 
crash, having suffered a heart attack, or having almost drowned in a pool. Having a variety of 
ways in which reminders of death are operationalized as life-in-the-face-of-death might help 
researchers better understand how realistic confrontations with death influence people’s resultant 
attitudes and behaviors. 
Conclusion 
 This study examined a different way in which thoughts of death can be conceptualized 
and operationalized to test Terror Management Theory: life-in-the-face-of-death (i.e., thinking 
about death more broadly, thinking about life while thinking about death, or thinking about death 
as more than just an end) and facing-death (i.e., thinking about death as finite, thinking about 
death exclusively, or thinking about death as the end). The findings of this study indicate that 
people who are reminded of death by a facing-death procedure report being more unwilling to 
forgive and more unwilling to accept an apology compared to people reminded of death by a life-
in-the-face-of-death procedure. The results of this investigation lend additional support for the 
notion that how people think about death can affect their behavior, and certain prompts about 
death might be better at evoking socially positive actions toward others. 
  
 
46 
TABLE 1 
Descriptives for Demographic Information on Final Sample 
 
Descriptives for Demographic Information on Final Sample 
 
                     Frequency Distribution  Mean  Range 
                      (n=52)                                (SD) 
Demographic 
 
Gender  
 
         Male                                            19 (36%)      n/a                  n/a 
 
Female                                        33 (64%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
Age                                                             n/a  20.79            (18-30) 
 (3.04) 
Class standing  
 
 First year       24 (46%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Second year       13 (25%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Third year         9 (17%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Fourth year         4 (8%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 5+ years                         2 (4%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
Comfortability with                                    n/a       6.77   (1-7)   
     English  (0.47) 
 
Relationship type to  
     offender  
 
 Family member        7 (13%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Friend        18 (35%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Romantic Partner      18 (35%)       n/a                  n/a 
 
 Other          9 (17%)       n/a                  n/a 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Mood, Hurt, and Empathy and Comparisons Among the Final 
Sample 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Mood, Hurt, and Empathy and Comparisons Among the Final Sample 
 
      LIFD            FD          LIFDctrl       FDctrl       Overall 
     (n=13)        (n=12)        (n=19)   (n=8)        (n=52) 
 
Survey item       M     M                M                 M              M       F 
      (SD)            (SD)       (SD)    (SD)          (SD)     (df)        ηp 2 
 
 
Positive mood      4.54           4.31       4.23    3.03          4.14     2.38       .13 
 (1.38) (1.22) (1.38) (1.26) (1.38)    (3,48) 
 
Negative mood     2.97 2.72  2.67  2.70 2.76 0.19 .01 
 (1.53) (0.91) (1.05) (0.96) (1.12)          (3,48) 
 
Feelings of hurt        
             
         In the past    6.54a 6.92b  5.67ab  6.13  6.25  2.97 .16 
 (0.99) (0.29) (1.67)           (1.06)  (1.27)    (3,48) 
 
         In the           4.00          3.13           3.68             3.63 3.63 0.46 .03 
         present (2.35)  (1.43) (1.94) (1.33) (1.85)    (3,48) 
 
Trait empathy       5.23 5.49          5.12             4.98  5.21 0.68  .04 
 (1.00)  (0.70) (0.91) (0.79) (0.86)          (3,48) 
 
       Perspective    5.07          5.20  4.95             4.95  5.04  0.19  .01 
       taking  (0.94)  (0.94)  (1.02)  (1.02)  (0.96)    (3,48) 
 
       Empathic       5.40 5.79          5.28 5.02  5.38 0.93 .06  
       concern  (1.47) (0.70) (1.07) (0.69) (1.07)    (3,48) 
        
            
Note. LIFD= Life-in-the-face-of-death, FD= facing-death, LIFDctrl= life-in-the-face-of-death 
control, and FDctrl= facing-death control. Similar subscript letters indicate significant 
differences between conditions with mean differences being significant at p < .05.  
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TABLE 3 
Planned Comparisons Between the Different Death Reminders 
 
Planned Comparisons Between the Different Death Reminders 
 
          LIFD           FD                  95% CI 
         (n=13)       (n=12)    
           Cohen’s  
Variable            M                M           t(48)             LL       UL       d      
          (SD)            (SD) 
 
Willingness to forgive       3.49      2.76 2.05*     0.02 1.44 .71 
overall  (1.12)  (0.92)         
 
Willingness to accept        2.96      1.90 2.19*    0.09 2.08 .84 
an apology  (1.40)  (1.14)   
 
Note. LIFD= life-in-the-face-of-death; FD= facing-death; CI= confidence interval; LL= lower 
limit; UL= upper limit. 
*p < .05. 
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TABLE 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences by Priming Condition 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences by Priming Condition 
 
     Priming Condition 
 
          LIFD           FD          LIFDctrl   FDctrl 
         (n=13) (n=12)        (n=19)        (n=8) 
 
Variable           M             M                M               M                F             ηp 2 
   (SD)   (SD)            (SD)           (SD)            (df) 
 
Willingness to forgive       3.49a      2.76abc 3.59b     4.04c 3.80 .19 
overall  (1.12)  (0.92) (0.57) (1.01)          (3,48) 
 
Unwillingness        2.74      2.21 2.60     3.54 3.80 .11 
to enact revenge  (1.49)  (1.07) (1.04) (1.37)          (3,48) 
 
Unwillingness        5.60      4.67 5.71     5.65 1.58 .09 
to avoid    (1.55)  (1.64) (1.08) (1.40)          (3,48) 
 
Willingness to 2.62      1.82ab 2.97a     3.31b 3.25 .17 
act benevolently  (1.66)  (0.68) (1.08) (1.07)          (3,48) 
 
Willingness to accept        2.96a      1.90abc 3.06b     3.95c 4.67 .23 
an apology  (1.40)  (1.14) (1.31) (0.78)          (3,48) 
 
Note. LIFD= Life-in-the-face-of-death, FD= facing-death, LIFDctrl= life-in-the-face-of-death 
control, and FDctrl= facing-death control. Similar subscript letters indicate significant 
differences between conditions with mean differences being significant at p < .05. 
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APPENDIX A 
Consent Form 
 
University of Hawai'i 
Consent to Participate in a Research Project 
Giovanni Vila, Principal Investigator 
Project title: Assessing Personality Differences in Response to a Hurtful Event 
 
Aloha! My name is Giovanni Vila and you are invited to take part in a research study. I am a 
graduate student at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa in the Department of Communicology. 
As part of the requirements for earning my graduate degree, I am conducting this research 
project. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between certain personalities in 
response to a hurtful event. Some examples of a hurtful event could be an ex-boyfriend or 
girlfriend having cheated on you, a friend having stolen money from you, or a stranger shouting 
racial slurs at you. I am asking you to participate in this project because you are at least 18 years 
old and have experienced a hurtful event that you can recall and still feel hurt about. 
 
What am I being asked to do?  
If you decide to participate in this project, you will be asked to fill out a variety of questions 
concerning your personality and describe the hurtful event and your reaction to it. Most 
responses will be multiple choice, whereas some questions will ask you to write about 1 to 2 
paragraphs in response to the prompt provided.  
 
Taking part in this study is your choice.  
Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. You may stop participating at any 
time. If you stop being in the study, there will be no penalty or loss to you. Your choice to 
participate or not participate will not affect your rights to services under the UH system. 
 
Why is this study being done? 
The purpose of my project is to evaluate how particular personalities might affect a response to a 
hurtful event. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part in this study? 
The survey will consist of several multiple choice and open-ended questions. Completing the 
survey will take approximately 30 minutes. The survey can be accessed on this website if you 
choose to consent to participate. 
 
What are the risks and benefits of taking part in this study? 
I believe there is little risk to you for participating in this research project. You may become 
stressed or uncomfortable answering any of the survey questions. If you do become stressed or 
uncomfortable, you can skip the question or take a break. You can also stop taking the survey or 
you can withdraw from the project altogether. There will be no direct benefit to you for 
participating in this survey.  
 
As researchers we are not qualified to provide counseling services and we will not be following 
up with you after this study. If you feel upset after completing the study or find that some 
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questions or aspects of the study triggered distress, talking with a qualified clinician may help. If 
you feel you would like assistance, please contact: 
 
Counseling and Student Development Center (CSDC) 808-956-7927, Monday-Friday 8:00 am - 
4:30 pm, http://manoa.hawaii.edu/counseling/our_services/personal_counseling.php 
 
Confidentiality and Privacy:  
I will not ask you for any personally identifying information, such as your name or address. 
Please do not include any real names in your survey responses. I will keep all study data secure 
on a password protected computer. Only my University of Hawai'i advisor and I will have access 
to the information. Other agencies that have legal permission have the right to review research 
records. The University of Hawai'i Human Studies Program has the right to review research 
records for this study. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions about this study, please call or email me at 
gvila@hawaii.edu. You may also contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Amy Hubbard, at 
aebesu@hawaii.edu. You may contact the UH Human Studies Program at 808.956.5007 or to 
discuss problems, concerns and questions, obtain information, or offer input with an informed 
individual who is unaffiliated with the specific research protocol. Please visit 
https://www.hawaii.edu/researchcompliance/information-research-participants for more 
information on your rights as a research participant. 
 
Please print or save a copy of this page for your reference. 
 
If you agree to participate in this project, please select the box “I consent”. 
   
❏ I consent  
❏ I do not consent  
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APPENDIX B 
Demographic Information and Previous Forgiveness Check 
 
Directions: For the following question, please select the answer that best describes you. 
 
1. Gender 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. I prefer not to say 
2. Class standing 
a. First year 
b. Second year 
c. Third year 
d. Fourth year 
e. 5 years or more 
3. Age  
a. 18 through 70 
4. How comfortable are you with English? 
a. 1(Extremely uncomfortable) 
b. 7(Extremely Comfortable) 
5. With respect to the situation you were asked to recall and describe (the hurtful event caused 
by the actions of another person), has this person ever apologized to you? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t recall 
6. If you answered “yes” to the previous question, did you accept that person’s apology in the 
past?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
7. Prior to participating in this study, to what extent had you forgiven this person for the hurtful 
event? 
a. Not at all  
b. A little 
c. To some degree 
d. To a great extent 
e. Completely forgiven 
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APPENDIX C 
Debriefing Information 
 
Thank you for your participation in our research project, titled Assessing Personality Differences 
in Response to a Hurtful Event. 
 
The questions you were asked during your participation in this study dealt with serious topics.  
For this reason, before you exit this study, I would like to ask you to please click on the link 
provided below to focus on more lighthearted topics.  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8NVlYCwqIc  
 
As researchers we are not qualified to provide counseling services and we will not be following 
up with you after this study. If you feel upset after completing the study or find that some 
questions or aspects of the study triggered distress, talking with a qualified clinician may help. If 
you feel you would like assistance, please contact: 
 
Counseling and Student Development Center (CSDC) 808-956-7927, Monday-Friday 8:00 am - 
4:30 pm,  
 
Hawai’i  
Hawai’i Psychological Association (HPA) http://www.hawaiipsychology.org/default.aspx 
 
24 Hour Crisis Text Line 741-741 Text "HELLO" or "ALOHA" 
 
Mental Health America of Hawai’i (MHA-HI), (808) 521-1846,  
 
24 Hour Crisis Line, (808) 935-0677 
 
Crisis Line of Hawaiʻi 24 Hour Support, 1-800-753-6879 
 
National 
Crisis Text Line: Text HOME to 741741 in the U.S. 
 
National Help Line Center http://www.helplinecenter.org/ 
 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) https://www.nami.org/ 
 
National Suicide Prevention Lifeline https://suicidepreventionlifeline.org/, 1-800-273-8255 
 
Psychology Today https://therapists.psychologytoday.com/rms/ 
 
PRIDE Counseling https://www.pridecounseling.com  
 
In the case of an emergency please call 911. 
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APPENDIX D 
Life-in-the-face-of-death (Priming Condition 1) 
(Taken from Cozzolino et al.’s, 2004, Death Reflection Manipulation) 
 
*As a reminder, if you feel uncomfortable at any time, you are free to stop participating at any 
time. 
 
Directions: The following scenario and set of questions is a new form of projective personality 
assessment in which the content of the answers in response to near death scenario will be 
analyzed. After reading the following scenario and taking some time to visualize yourself in the 
scenario, please respond to the subsequent questions as if the event you read actually occurred. 
 
Imagine that you are visiting a friend who lives on the 20th floor of an old, downtown apartment 
building. It’s the middle of the night when you are suddenly awakened from a deep sleep by the 
sound of screams and the choking smell of smoke. You reach over to the nightstand and turn on 
the light. You are shocked to find the room filling fast with thick clouds of smoke. You run to 
the door and reach for the handle. You pull back in pain as the intense heat of the knob scalds 
you violently. Grabbing a blanket off the bed and using it as protection, you manage to turn the 
handle and open the door. Almost immediately, a huge wave of flame and smoke roars into the 
room, knocking you back and literally off your feet. There is no way to leave the room. It is 
getting very hard to breathe and the heat from the flames is almost unbearable. Panicked, you 
scramble to the only window in the room and try to open it. As you struggle, you realize the old 
window is virtually painted shut around all the edges. It doesn’t budge. Your eyes are barely 
open now, filled with tears from the smoke. You try calling out for help but the air to form the 
words is not there. You drop to the floor hoping to escape the rising smoke, but it is too late. The 
room is filled top to bottom with thick fumes and nearly entirely in flames. With your heart 
pounding, it suddenly hits you, as time seems to stand still, that you are literally moments away 
from dying. The inevitable unknown that was always waiting for you has finally arrived. Out of 
breath and weak, you shut your eyes and wait for the end. 
 
1.   Please describe in detail the thoughts and emotions you felt while imagining the scenario. 
2.   If you did experience this event, how do you think you would handle the final moments? 
3.   Again, imagining it did happen to you, describe the life you led up to that point. 
4.   How do you feel your family would react if it did happen to you? 
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APPENDIX E 
Life-in-the-face-of-death control (Priming Condition 3) 
(Taken from Cozzolino et al.’s, 2004, “no death” control condition) 
 
*As a reminder, if you feel uncomfortable at any time, you are free to stop participating at any 
time. 
 
Directions: The following scenario and set of questions is a new form of projective personality 
assessment in which the content of the answers in response to a normal day scenario will be 
analyzed. After reading the following scenario and taking some time to visualize yourself in the 
scenario, please respond to the subsequent questions as if the event you read actually occurred. 
 
Imagine that you are visiting a friend who lives on the 20th floor of a downtown apartment 
building. You are awakened from a deep sleep by the sound of a clock radio and the pleasant 
smell of coffee. You get up to get ready for a day of sightseeing and shopping with a family 
member. After your day spent with your family member, you come back home for dinner with 
your friend and then get ready for bed.  
1. Please describe in detail the thoughts and emotions you felt while imagining the scenario.  
2. Have you ever experienced an event like the one described in the scenario?  
3. Imagining an event like the one described did happen to you, describe the life you led up to 
that point.  
4. Again imagining this event did happen to you, describe the thoughts and emotions of the 
family member with whom you spent the day.  
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APPENDIX F 
Mood Measurement (Distraction Task 1) 
(Adapted from Watson et al.’s, 1988, Positive and Negative Affective Schedule) 
 
Directions: This questionnaire consists of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to 
what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Please mark a number 
from 1 (does not describe me at all) to 7 (describes me very well)) according to what you feel 
with the provided word.  
 
Positive affect: 
1. Interested 
2. Excited 
3. Strong 
4. Enthusiastic 
5. Proud 
6. Alert 
7. Inspired 
8. Determined 
9. Attentive 
10. Active 
 
Negative mood: 
1.   Distressed 
2.   Upset 
3.   Guilty 
4.   Scared 
5.   Hostile 
6.   Irritable 
7.   Ashamed 
8.   Nervous 
9.   Jittery 
10. Afraid 
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APPENDIX G 
Crossword Puzzle (Distraction Task 2) 
 
Directions: Your personality will also be measured based on your ability to solve as many words 
as you can in the following crossword puzzle but by no means do you have to complete the 
crossword puzzle. The answers for the crossword puzzle will be provided on the next page. 
 
 
Answers: 
Across: 
1. Crush 
2. Pepsi 
3. Mountain-dew 
Down: 
1. Coke 
2. Sunkist 
3. Sprite 
4. Fanta 
5. Mug  
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APPENDIX H 
Hurtful Event Writing Prompt 
(Adapted from Van Tongeren et al., 2013) 
 
*As a reminder, if you feel uncomfortable at any time, you are free to stop participating at any 
time. 
 
Directions: Please think of someone who has deeply hurt or offended you. Think about a 
specific act that this person did to hurt or offend you. Some examples of an act that might make 
you feel these emotions could be an ex-boyfriend or girlfriend having cheated on you, a friend 
having stolen money from you, or a stranger shouting racial slurs at you. (Note: please avoid 
describing an act of physical or sexual abuse.) Please take a few minutes to completely visualize 
the thoughts, feelings, and emotions you had when thinking about this hurtful act. Without 
writing any names, write a description of the specific act that this person did and describe your 
thoughts, feelings, and emotions in as much detail as possible in the text box below. 
 
Directions: For the next set of questions, please select the answer that best answers the question. 
 
1. What type of relationship did you have with the person you described? 
a. Family member 
b. Friend 
c. Romantic partner 
d. Other:__________ 
 
2. How long ago was the event you described?  
______days 
______months 
______years 
  
 
At the time of the event that you described, how did you feel?  
 
(extremely not hurt)  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely hurt) 
 
(extremely not angry) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely angry) 
 
(extremely not sad)  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely sad) 
 
How do you feel about the event right now? 
 
(extremely not hurt)  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely hurt) 
 
(extremely not angry) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely angry) 
 
(extremely not sad)  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 (extremely sad) 
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APPENDIX I 
Willingness to Accept an Apology 
 
Directions: For this next set of questions, imagine that the person you wrote about attempted to 
apologize to you now (regardless of what the person may have done in the past). For the 
following statements, please select a number from 1 (Highly disagree) to 7 (Highly agree) on 
your level of agreement with each statement. When selecting a number, please keep in mind the 
person who you described as hurting you.    
     
1. If this person tried to apologize to me, I would be willing to accept that person’s apology. 
2. An apology from this person would be genuine. 
3. If this person apologizes, this person is willing to admit responsibility for his/her actions. 
4. If this person apologized to me, that person is trying to right the wrong that he/she 
committed.  
5. I believe that if this person apologizes, the apology was only intending to make him/her feel 
better about him/her self. (-)   
 
* Items denoted with “(-)” will be reverse scored so that higher values indicate a higher degree of 
willingness to accept a transgressor’s apology. 
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APPENDIX J 
Willingness to Forgive 
(Adapted from McCullough et al.’s, 2006, Transgression Related Interpersonal Motivations 
Inventory). 
 
Directions: For the following statements, please select a number from 1(Highly disagree) to 
7(Highly agree) on your level of agreement with each statement. When selecting a number, 
please keep in mind the person who you were describing in the task where you were asked to 
depict a hurtful event that you feel a person had committed toward you. To what extent do these 
statements reflect the way you feel about this person right now? 
 
Revenge: 
1. I’ll make him/her pay. 
2. I wish that something bad would happen to him/her. 
3. I want him/her to get what he/she deserves. 
4. I’m going to get even. 
5. I want to see him/her hurt and miserable. 
 
Avoidance: 
1. I am trying to keep as much distance between us as possible. 
2. I am living as if he/she doesn’t exist/isn’t around. 
3. I don’t trust him/her. 
4. I am finding it difficult to act warmly toward him/her. 
5. I cut off the relationship with him/her. 
6. I am avoiding him/her. 
7. I withdraw from him/her. 
 
Benevolence: 
1. Even though his/her actions hurt me, I have goodwill for him/her. 
2. I want us to bury the hatchet and move forward with our relationship. 
3. Despite what he/she did, I want us to have a positive relationship again. 
4. Although he/she hurt me, I am putting the hurts aside so we could resume our relationship. 
5. I forgive him/her for what he/she did to me. 
6. I have released my anger so I can work on restoring our relationship to health. 
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APPENDIX K 
Trait Empathy Assessment 
(Adapted from Davis’s, 1980, Interpersonal Reactivity Index) 
 
Directions: Below is a list of statements that describe general personality characteristics. Please 
read each statement carefully and rate how strongly from 1(Does not describe me very well) to 
7(Describes me very well) the statement describes you. 
 
Perspective-Taking: 
1. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.  
2. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments. (-)  
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.  
4. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
5. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (-)  
6. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
7. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.  
 
Empathic Concern: 
1. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them.  
2. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. (-)  
3. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
4. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
5. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. (-)  
6. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (-)  
7. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
 
* Items denoted with “(-)” will be reverse scored so that higher values indicate a higher degree of 
trait-empathy. 
 
 
 
 
 
